The Trump administration is now determining what the future holds for Ukraine, and by extension for Europe, in matters of territorial integrity, sovereignty and security. Washington aims to make a deal to end the full-scale war Russia launched in February 2022 that Russian President Vladimir Putin has waged against Ukraine, even if it means abandoning longstanding international principles that prohibit the recognition of territory acquired through military occupation.
For Europe more broadly, and the European Union in particular, however, there is far more at stake than those principles, which Washington has rarely prioritised in its own foreign policy.
Deterring Putin from further aggression, and ensuring that Ukraine is stable both politically and economically, lies at the core of the bloc’s security and political concerns. A settlement to the conflict that fails to achieve either would risk the bloc’s own long-term security.
Of course, all of this must be managed while ensuring that the Trump administration does not itself further endanger European security by once again casting doubt on its commitment to NATO’s security infrastructure. But Europe has already, if belatedly, begun to wake up to these concerns. By last year, 23 NATO members were spending the target 2 percent of GDP on defence, and the alliance agreed a new goal of raising core defence spending to at least 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035, with up to another 1.5 percent of GDP to be spent on critical infrastructure and on expanding their defence industrial bases.
More immediately, Europe has also surpassed the US for the first time since June 2022 in total military aid for Ukraine, with 72 billion euros ($83.6bn) allocated compared with Washington’s 65 billion euros ($75.5bn) by the end of April, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker.
Yet, regardless of the outcome of the Trump administration’s efforts to push Ukraine towards a negotiating position that Putin might be willing to accept, the increased European support is not enough to offset the standstill in US funding. Military aid is also only one part of the picture: Kyiv is dependent on the West’s fiscal aid as well, to ensure the continued functioning of its government. And the bill for reconstruction only continues to grow as Russia’s assaults and aerial attacks continue. In February, the World Bank estimated it at $524bn (506 billion euros) —about 280 percent of Kyiv’s 2024 GDP.
Without dramatic action, Europe risks being left to Trump’s whims as to its future security, despite having bowed to his demands not only on NATO spending and military support for Ukraine, but also on trade through agreements that have seen the US’s average tariff rate on imports from the EU and UK rise sharply.
But there is a clear policy choice that Europe can make to ensure that financial support for Kyiv remains sufficient over the coming years and to shape the outcome of any settlement to the conflict, while simultaneously further deterring Putin.
The European Union and the United Kingdom can move to confiscate the sovereign Russian funds frozen in their jurisdictions since 2022. Most importantly, they can seize the 185 billion euros ($214.8bn) frozen at the Belgium-based clearing house Euroclear – the majority of which is now in cash and can thus rapidly be deployed or reinvested – as well as the Russian government funds frozen at Euroclear’s Luxembourg-based rival, Clearstream, which are estimated to amount to around 20 billion euros ($23.2bn).
Europe is not unaware of this possibility, and in fact, it has been debating doing so for months. The Euroclear assets have already been used to underpin an earlier $50bn (43 billion euros) loan to Ukraine finalised in January 2025, which is secured over earnings from those assets.
Europe had been expected to advance a plan to create a new loan – one amounting to as much as 140 billion euros ($162.6bn) – secured over the assets at the European Council meeting on December 18-19, after delaying a final decision at the previous council meeting on October 23. The delay was largely due to obstinacy from the Belgian government, which has demanded indemnification from the rest of Europe while endorsing Kremlin talking points that such a move would be unprecedented.
Yet there is ample precedent. German and Japanese government assets were seized by the United States in the course of the second world war. In the latter case, Japan’s assets were even frozen before the attack on Pearl Harbour, the majority of which were later retained under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.
The Kremlin’s threats to tie up Belgium in decades-long litigation are also overblown. They rely on a pre-Soviet-collapse bilateral investment treaty that Putin and his proxies have already failed to invoke successfully to unfreeze their assets or challenge previous sanctions. Additionally, there are dozens of unresolved claims worth tens of billions of dollars against Russia in European courts — including the roughly 13-billion-euro ($15bn) arbitration award won by energy firm Uniper against Gazprom for disruption to gas supplies in 2022. The largest and most significant case remains the 2014 award to former shareholders of Yukos, over the Kremlin’s expropriation of their company. That award survived all appeals: in October 2025, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands rejected Russia’s final challenge, confirming that the award — now valued at more than $65bn, including interest — is final and enforceable against Russian state assets worldwide. Enforcement, however, will still depend on locating suitable Russian assets that courts are willing and able to seize.
The Kremlin will certainly engage in lawfare and litigation over these disputes, as it has repeatedly throughout Putin’s tenure. But it will lose, and when its national interests are at stake, it will pay. Russia has repeatedly complied with adverse rulings when vital access to Western markets or assets was at stake. The only clear-cut cases of either the West or Russia returning funds owed as a result of litigation arising from Russia’s war have been the settlements paid by Russian state insurer NSK and aviation firm Aeroflot over Putin’s 2022 seizure of aircraft leased from Western companies.
There is no excuse for Europe’s delays in acting thus far. Every month of inaction increases both the financial burden on Europe and the likelihood that Washington will strike a deal that sidelines European interests. The question is now a critical one: how to ensure Ukraine’s continued financing and its ability to sustain its defence. It is also all the more important that Europe act before the Trump Administration tries to secure a deal with the Kremlin over its head.
The 28-point “peace plan” formulated by Kremlin insiders and signed off by Trump’s special envoy and long-time associate Steve Witkoff last month not only includes carving up these same frozen funds and even demands that Europe itself provide a further $100 billion, but would also divert frozen Russian assets away from Ukraine’s reconstruction while imposing an additional financial burden directly on Europe. Such a deal would leave Europe footing an even larger bill if the Kremlin fails to adhere to its commitments — as it did with the ceasefire agreements struck in 2014 and 2015 following its initial invasion of Ukraine.
Europe has the leverage to advance its political, economic and military security in the negotiations over Ukraine’s future, and it must not be afraid to use it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
